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BELIEF AND INTERPRETATION: 
MEDITATIONS ON PELIKAN'S "INTERPRETING THE 
BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION" 
Francis J Mootz ff l 
ls belief a prerequisite of interpret ation? Can we interpret a 
docum ent if we do not belie ve that it has somet hing to say to us, if we 
do not ant icipate tha t we can learn from the text? Jarosla v Pelikan's 
assessment of the similarities and difference s in constitutional and 
Biblical herm eneutics I does not raise this questi on expressly. but his 
eloquent description of how the faithful strugg le to remain true to their 
guiding texts inexo rably leads one to que stion the role of belief. In this 
essa y, I first acknowledge the unavoidable significance of belief in the 
elaboration of a textual tradition . Then, I argue that rhetorical and 
hermeneutic al principl es clarify the distinction between a faithful 
interpretation rooted in belief and the inauthentic manipulation of a text 
for strategic goals. 
Belief fost ers commitment to the text, which legitimizes and 
authenticates an interpreter's efforts. We readily distingui sh the 
constitutive exeget ical rhetoric that girds social life from the "mere" 
rhetoric emp loyed by sophistic interpr eters, characterizing the former as 
a vital and productive deve lopment of a tradition and the latter as a 
corruption of the tradition. Pelikan claim s that his goal is to formula te a 
general meth odo logy of faithful interpr etat ion, but his reflections 
confirm that there can be no neat methodological distinc tion between a 
legitim ate reading rooted in belief on one hand , and a strategic 
manipulati on of a tex t designed to undermine the cause for belief on the 
other. Makin g this distinction requires a jud gment that can be 
rhetorically defended but never method ologically ju stified; the faithful 
may prove themselves only in the "dan gero us maybe "2 of debate and 
t Profosso r of Law, Penn State Dickin son School of Law , tjmootz(a ;psu.edu. :fJ Francis J. 
Mootz III 2006 . An ear lier version of this essay was presented at the 2005 Annual Medi ng of the 
Assoc iation for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities in Austin, Texa s. I thank my 
fellow paneli sts. Gene Garve r and John Valauri, and the audie nce for their comments. 
I. Jaro slav Pdikan , Interpr eting the Bible & the Co11s1i111tion (Yale U. Press 2004 ). 
2. I endorse Nietzs che's famou s "da ngerous maybe" as expressing a willingness to break 
from biva lent thinkin g and embra ce the realm of rhetorical engagem ent that dea ls only with 
probabiliti es. Francis J. Moo tz 111, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 
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persuasion. As Gene Garver has argued, Aristotle's great advance was 
to show that rhetoric is an art of character and not just a matter oflogic. 3 
I would add that there can be no methodology of interpretation because 
there can be no methodology for developing one's character. 
If belief is central to interpretation, though, this would appear to 
consign interpretation to a wholly conventional practice immune from 
critical insight. A popular image in academia of one who believes is of 
one who does not listen to others (those who, presumably , know rather 
than merely believe). It may come as a surprise, then, that I will argue 
that belief is also central to critique. As Gianni Vattimo concludes, in 
the post-metaphysical age we find that belief returns to the forefront, 
although not in the form of the dogmatic religiosity of past eras. 4 The 
relationship between belief and interpretation is thus paradoxical: we 
must come to grips with the fact that belief is the prerequisite of critique, 
even as we acknowledge that it is only through critique that living 
belief-as opposed to doxa transmitted through idle chatter-is possible. 
Hermeneutical responsiveness and rhetorical elaboration are entwined 
expressions of a faithful relation to the text; belief nourishes a critical 
exegesis , which in tum enriches our beliefs. 
PELIKAN: INTERPRETING THE GREAT CODES FAITHFULLY AND A VOJDING 
CORRUPTION 
Pelikan displays an impressive breadth of learning and depth of 
thought by taking a productive tack on the well-worn analogy between 
Cardozo L. Rev. 967 (2003). Nietzsche critici zes philo sop her s for being unwilling to recognize 
that truth is deeply connected to deception, and he insist s on asking the dangerous que stion : is the 
value of truth 
insidiou sly related, tied to, and invol ved with these wic ked, seemingly opposite things -
ma ybe even one with them in essence . Maybe' 
But who has the will to concern him self with such dangerous maybes'? For that, one 
really has to wait for the advent of a new speci es of phil oso pher, such as have somehow 
an other converse taste and propen sity from those we ha ve kn own so far-philosophers 
of the "dangerous ma ybe" in every sense. 
Friedrich Nietzsche , Beyond Good and Evil, 12 at 10-1 1 (Walter Kaufmann trans. , Vintage Books 
1966). 
3. Eugene Garver, Aristotle's Rhetori c: An Art of Character 183 (Li. Chi. Press 1994): 
To rule on the basis of the law alone is a character flaw. Aristotle condemns the man 
who stand s on his right s in demandin g an ethicall y excessive sort of precision 
concerning justice in the distribution of goo ds. . . Similarly here. To argue on the basis 
of rea son alone is a character flaw, a failure of ethos, and therefore a failure to persuade. 
Excess ive prec ision is in both cases unethical because it takes something which should 
be within the range of praxis and judgment and makes it int o a subject for more preci se , 
scientific det ermination. 
4. infra nn . 3 5-41 . and accompanying text. 
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constitutional and Biblical hermeneutics. ' One of Pelikan's four essays 6 
describes how we can distinguish legitimate interpretive developments 
of a textual tradition from corruptions of that tradition when interpreters 
face "cruxes of interpretation." A crux interpretum involves difficulties 
in interpreting a text, either because the words are difficult to understand 
or because they raise doctrinal conundrums. 7 These cruxes generally are 
resolved by the ordinary Magisterium (in the everyday practices of the 
community) and sometimes by the extraordinary Magisterium (in the 
official pronouncements by the church or Supreme Court). 8 But 
resolving an interpretive difficulty is not the same as resolving it 
correctly. Pelikan emphasizes that it is imperative to distinguish healthy 
growth in a textual tradition from a cancerous growth that is at once 
vibrant and self-destructive. 
The development of doctrine in both religion and law has involved 
"the ongoing and cumulative interpretations of the Great Code in the 
form of tradition and precedent. "9 The significance of Vatican II to the 
Catholic Church is precisely that it epitomizes "the ongoing 
development of doctrine as a faithful interpretation of the original 
deposit in Scripture and even a faithful interpretation of the subsequent 
tradition." 10 Neither originalism nor literalism standing alone provides 
an adequate criterion for correctly interpreting the Bible or the 
constitution. 11 Therefore , Pelikan turns for guidance to Cardinal 
Newman's An Essay on the Development of' Christian Doctrine to 
account for the dynamic, historical, and tradition-bound activity of 
interpreting the Great Codes. 12 
Newman proposed "to discriminate healthy developments of an 
idea from its state of corruption and decay" 13 by offering seven "notes" 
5. My review essay highl ights a particular theme emerging from Pelikan's work. For a 
more gen era l rev iew essay. see Gregory L. Kalscheur, S.J., Christian Scripture and American 
Scripture: An Insrrucri"e Analogy, 21 J. L. & Rclig. IO 1- 142 (2005 -06). 
6. Pelikan's book was first ddiver ed as four talks at the Yale Law School in 2003 under the 
joint auspices of the Law School and the Divinity School, which were then prepared for 
publication. 
7. Pelikan, supra n. I. at 38. ln a wond erful example, he cite s the passage from scripture in 
which Jesus says "[ s]earch the [s]cripture s," notin g that it is ambiguous whether thi s is a divin e 
imperntiv e that girds literalist biblical exeges is or whether it is an indictm ent of those so bu sy 
reading holy texts that they don ' t look to the face of God. Id. at 42 . 
8. Id. at 55-5 6. 
9. Id. at 115. 
10. Id. at 122. 
11. Id. at 76- 114. 
12. Id. at 119-149 . 
13. Id. at 124 (quoting John Henry Newman, An Essay on rhe Development of Christian 
Doctrine 171 (U. Notre Dame Press 1969) (originally publish~d 1878). 
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regarding the harmonization of tradition and the changing social context. 
Because the proper development of doctrine cannot be proved by a 
Euclidean theorem or demonstrated by an Aristotelian syllogism ,14 the 
seven notes are not a methodology for developing doctrine as much as 
they are topoi one should employ in defending the legitimacy of a 
particular interpretation. 
Pelikan succinctly relates Newman's seven notes with excellent 
examples drawn from both religion and law. The first note is 
"Preservation of Its Type," by which Newman means adhering to the 
type of textual tradition at issue and refusing the temptation to engage in 
a different discourse altogether. One might regard this as a 
common sensical injunction not to approach the Bible as a scientific 
monologue or to approach the Constitution as a literary effort so as to 
avoid corrupting these texts and their interpretive traditions, but there is 
an important point in making this "universally accepted criterion" 15 
explicit. Newman's first note emphasizes that an interpreter must 
approach the text from within the history of its effects within a culture, 
and that failure to do so amounts to a relinquishment of the "calling " to 
serve as an interpreter. 16 The Protestant Refonnation repre sented a 
dramatic schism in Christianity , but the Protestant confessions embraced 
the same general type of interpreti ve tradition that had preceded Manin 
Luther ' s actions; indeed, they claim to preserve the tradition that had 
been corrupted by the Roman church. 
The second note is a substantive corollary to the first, with 
"Continuity of Its Principles " calling for the preservation of animating 
principles despite changes in the details of the textual tradition. Pelikan 
argues that the development of the doctrine of the Trinity permitted the 
Church to preserve the competing principles of monothei sm and the 
incarnation of God in the person of Jesus. 17 Just as an interpreter must 
approach the text with respect for its type, so too the interpret er must 
maintain the fundamental principles of the textual tradition, even if 
doing so requires significant doctrinal development. 
Newman 's first two notes will strike the modem critical 
consciousness as extremely problematic: how can one critically appraise 
and develop a tradition if one is consigned to approach the text within its 
received tradition? And yet, Pelikan surely is justified in recalling 
Newman 's insights, inasmuch as one cannot imagine developing a 
14. Id at 123. 
15. Id at 125. 
16. Id. 
17. /J. at 133. 
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textual tradition that spans centuries or millennia without requmng 
adherence to its genre and core principles. But this is just to say that 
belief inevitably is at the center of the interpretive undertaking. The 
interpreter must give herself over to the tradition by respecting its type 
and established principles and believing in the legitimacy and worth of 
the tradition, even if there is an unending dispute among believers about 
what faithfulness may require in particular interpretive situations. 
The next four notes in Newman's account elaborate the goal of 
developing principles within a genre. The third note, "Its Power of 
Assimilation," concerns the necessity of incorporating knowledge 
external to the tradition into its development, as occurs when Biblical 
interpreters take account of natural science and constitutional 
interpreters take account of social science. 18 The fourth note is 
designated, "Its Logical Sequence," by which Newman means that 
interpretations must develop doctrine in a manner that appears almost 
compelled by the preceding tradition, with precipitous shifts viewed as a 
corruption of interpretation. 19 The fifth note, "Anticipation of Its 
Future," is related to the fourth, in that a healthy development of a 
textual tradition requires that contemporary developments be regarded as 
having been anticipated in the tradition, although these anticipations 
might be "vague and isolated." 2° Finally, the sixth note, "Conservative 
Action upon its Past," declares the importance of preserving antecedent 
developments and avoiding the corruption that occurs by making a sharp 
break from the prior tradition. 21 Interpretive developments must 
conserve the past and bring its principles to bear in the present, rather 
than rejecting the foregoing tradition altogether. 
These four notes provide unexceptional gloss on the idea that 
interpreters must remain faithful to the tradition and believe that the text 
continues to speak to the interpreter's world; they counsel interpreters to 
mediate adaptation and preservation, innovation and constraint, and 
literalism and dynamism. But finding the golden hermeneutical mean in 
practice is no easy task. In light of the postmodern declaration of the 
18. Id. at 134-J 37. Pervasive racism in America has shaped the constitutional doctrines 
announced in Plessy, Korematsu and Brown, Pelikan writes. and so the task is to detennmc if the 
assimilation of such external principles are valid or invalid in light of the developing textual 
tradition. Id. at 136-137. 
19. Id. at 137-140. Pelikan suggests that Marburr v. Madison succe.::ds by presenting its 
conclusions as the logical deductions of const1tutionalism \tsel( such that one cannot reject the 
Marbury development of tradition without rejecting the constitut10nal structure itself. Id. at 140. 
20. Id. at 140- 142. Thus, Brown v. Bd. of'Educ. is offered by the Court as the fulfillment of 
anticipations stretching back to the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, although these 
anticipations were certainly "vague and isolated." Id. at 142. 
21. Id. at 143-146. 
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death of the author and her replacement by the interpreter, one might 
question whether celebrating belief in a text and its interpretive 
trajectory will, in political effect, result in a balkanization that 
undermines the possibility for communal traditions. Pelikan speaks to 
this concern in his discussion of the final note. 
Newman's seventh note provides the ultimate criterion for 
distinguishing valid growth from a cancerous corruption of the tradition: 
"Its Chronic Vigor." Pelikan agrees that this note is " in some ways a 
summary recapitulation of the other six. Because, he [Newman] argued, 
'corruption cannot be of long standing,' it followed that 'duration is 
another test of a faithful development. "' 22 The "test of time " is the 
ultimate arbiter of faithful interpretat ion simply because corruptions of 
the tradition cannot be long-standing. Pelikan quotes Newman's 
homage to centuries of development in the Biblical tradition despite 
facing tremendous adversity, in which Newman celebrates the fact that 
the Christian tradition is 
still living, if there be a living [ ... ] philosophy in the world; 
vigorous, energetic, persuasive, progressive ; vires acquirit eundo 
[it gathers strength as it moves along] ; it grows and is not 
overgrown; it spreads out, yet is not enfeebled; it is ever 
germinating , yet ever consistent with itself. 23 
Pelikan concludes that Newman's triumphant assessment applies equally 
to the long tradition of constitutional hermeneutics. 24 
Newman's seven notes purport to be criteria of faithful 
interpretation and to suggest the means for distinguishing corruptions of 
that tradition, but Pelikan fails to acknowledge that Newman's 
assessment of the Catholic tradition necessarily issues from within that 
tradition. Newman speaks as a believ er; his assessment might be 
persuasive , but it will not operate as a proof when directed to non-
believers. What are we to make of the claims by Protestant confessions 
that Catholicism represents some manner of a corruption of the Christian 
faith , or Judaism 's assertion that Christianity itself is a corruption of the 
original Covenant with God? In the modem era , we readily accept a 
plurality of incommensurable religious faiths, all of which assert their 
primacy within a liberal legal tradition that tolerates them all as useful 
cultural resources but officially subscribes to none. Newman may spea k 
to fellow believers and persuade them of the vitality of the Roman 
Catholic interpretive tradition, but he cannot dispro ve the vitality of 
22. Id. at 146(quotingN ewman's 1878rev .e d.). 
23. Id. ut 149. 
24. Id. 
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Islam or Judaism from an extra-traditionary perspective. 
Although we may have agreed to adopt a relativist perspective as to 
competing interpretations of spirituality such that no single faith may lay 
claim to truth or universalism in the public sphere, it should be obvious 
that we cannot do so with respect to our "civic religion" of 
constitutionalism. The very challenge of constitutionalism is to 
faithfully develop a continuous governance tradition that is legitimate 
for the entire polity. To allude to the concessions that we have made in 
respect of our contemporary religious pluralism: can we suffer a 
situation in which Anti-Federalists and Federalists both assert that they 
have defined the core of our constitutional tradition; can we permit 
royalists to persist in challenging the break with England as a 
fundamental corruption of our legal tradition; can we take account of 
anarchists who simply do not believe in the authority of law; can we, in 
other words, consign constitutionalism to a matter merely of belief? 
Pelikan 's work leads me to the questions that motivate this essay. 
Can healthy and valid developments of a textual tradition be recognized 
only by believers? If so, does this discount the possibility of rigorous 
critique of interpretive traditions and consign these traditions to be 
insular and self-replicating, leaving us with competing traditions each of 
which have believers but none of which can definitively establish itself 
as a legitimate and vital tradition? Pelikan's assessment of the 
similarities of Biblical and constitutional hermeneutics only raises these 
questions; contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy 
supplements his discussion and points toward a resolution. 
GADAMER: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics acknowledges 
the central role of belief in understanding and critique, and so I tum first 
to his philosophy in an effort to expand on Pelikan's themes. 25 Gadamer 
argues that textual understanding emerges from a "hermeneutical circle" 
rather than as the product of a linear methodology. 26 The hermeneutical 
circle refers to the constant relational tension between the text in its 
entirety and the specific part of the text under consideration. Critics 
often charge that this circle is vicious because the interpreter can't 
25. The following synopsis of Gadamer's philosophy is best explained in detail in his 
magnum opus. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Tnith and Method (Joel Weisnsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall rev. & trans., 2d rev. ed. Crossroad Publg. 1989). For my application of these themes to 
legal theory. see Francis J. Mootz Ill, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Critical Legal 
Themy (U. Ala. Press 2006). 
26. Gadamer. supra n. 25. at 190. 
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understand a part of the text without understanding the whole, but at the 
same time the interpreter can gain an under standing of the entire text 
only by understanding its discrete parts. 27 Martin Heidegger ' s path-
breaking work demonstrated that the henneneutical circle is vicious only 
when view ed through the myopic lens of modem methodologism. 28 Just 
as the "chicken or the egg" dilemma poses a problem only wh en one 
look s at both objects atemporally and then attempts to discern a causal 
link between the static entiti es, so too the relationship of whole and part 
becomes problematic when the activit y of understandin g is drained of its 
dynamic and historical character . Gadamer expand s on Heidegger 's 
earl y phenomenology by empha sizing that an interpreter comes to a text 
with fore-understandings ( or, prejudice s) that help to shape the 
interpreter 's anticipation that the text carries a coherent message. The 
reader ' s "anticipation of completeness" is constantly revised in the 
cour se of reading ; consequentl y, the relation ship of whole to part is 
neithe r hierarchical nor directing, but rather is mutually implic ating .2'> 
The se basic premises of philosophical henneneutic s amount to a 
phenom enology of the role of belief in interpretation. The reader 's 
prejudice s (including the prejudice that the work bears a coherent 
message that can be under s tood) represent the reader's belief in the 
value of the text. Interpretation occurs in the structure of question and 
answe r: the reader po ses questions to the text, but the text also poses 
questions to the reader. It is the reader 's faith in the value of thi s 
interpretive conv ersati on that drives her to engage the text. 
Critics challenge Gadamer for conferring authority on the text and 
pennitting faith to devolve into uncritical deference .30 This charge is 
familiar in both Biblical and con stitutional hermeneutics. How can a 
27. Id. at266-267. 
28. Heidegg er emphasizes that to see viciousness in the hermeneutica l circle of historica l 
underst anding "and to look fo r ways to avoid it. even to feel' thal it is an inev itable imperfec tio11. 
is to misunderstand w1ders1a11di11g fr om the ground up. . . . Wha t is decisive is not to get out or 
the circle, but to get in it in the right way. '' Manin Heidegger, Being and Time 143 (Joan 
Stamba ugh trans., SUNY Press 1996) (p . 153, 7th German ed. 1953). 
29. Gadamer discusses this problem in broader tenns by discuss ing the role of experie nce in 
the development of moral-practical wisdom. A person can' t make an ethical choice without 
having practical wisdom, but practical wisdom can 't be cultivated except by making ethical 
choices. Following Aristotle , Gadamer argues that this situation highlights the centrn lity of 
experience as the means by which this henne neuti ca l circle of decis ion and action is enac ted. 
Gadamcr, supra n. 25. at 346-362. 
30. Paul Ricocu r famously mediat ed the Gadamer-Habem1as dispute. arguing in a cha ritable 
and responsible fashion that Gadamer 's hem1eneutics tended to discount the possibil ity and role of 
critique. S1ce Paul Ricoeur. Hermen eutics and the Critique (!f"ldeolvgy, in From Text to Action : 
Essays in Hermeneutics. 11 (John B. Thompson trans., No rthwestern U. Press 199 l ). Ricoeur 
seeks to secure faith against the suspicions of modernity and the naivile of traditio n. 
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believer interpreting the Bible, or a judge interpreting the Constituti on, 
rise above dogmati sm and the historical context of oppression and 
scholasticism in which these documents have been appli ed in the past? 
Gadamer's answer is that the interpreter's faithful embrace of the text is 
prec isely what permit s the reader to achieve crit ical distanc e. He 
captures this dimension of interpret ation with his notion of the "fusion 
of hor izons."31 
When interpr eting a text, the reader's horizon al pre-unde rstanding s 
are confronted and affected . Gadamer regards the text as an active 
dialogue partner, arguing that understanding occurs as the text takes on 
meaning in light of the reader's prejudices and the reader's prejudi ces 
are adjus ted in light of the text. This amounts to a "fusion of horizons, " 
not in the sense of merging into a unity but rather as a mutual 
engagemen t. 32 
Gadamer uses the met aphor of conversation to explore the critical 
distance inherent in interpretation. By conversation, he does not mean 
superfici al banter or socia l pleasantrie s; rather, he calls to mind genuine 
conversations as a dialogic activity that engages the particip ants. He 
rejects the exegetical model of a reader prost rate before a classical text 
that must be honored with reverent defer ence for the truths contain ed 
within it. Instead, the text is a provoca tion and challenge that has an 
evo lving "effect ive history." The interpr eter finds that her prejudices 
are put at risk and brought up short, and this is the moment of critical 
insight. 33 
31 . See Francis J. Mootz IJL, The Que.\·t w Reprogram Cultur al Softwa l"<!: A flerme11eutical 
Response to Jack Balkin 's Theory of Ideo logy and Cririque, 76 Chi-Kcn1 L. Rev. 945, 977-989 
(2000) (arguin g that Gadamer's philo sophy is profit ably read in this manner through the work of 
P. Chr istoph er Smith and Calvin Schrag). 
32. Gadamer, supra n. 25, at 306-307. 
33. Gadamer emphasize s that it is the willingne ss to engage a tcx1. fueled by a he lief that the 
text has $Omething to offer . that genera tes critical distance. Gadame r equa1es a text with a 
conversation partne r, and so the followin g quote applies equally to a reader who see ks to interpr et 
a text. 
Who has not had the experienc e- especia lly before the other whom we want to 
pers uade-of how the reasons that one had for one's own view . and even the reasons 
that speak against one 's own view rush into words. The mere presence of the other 
before whom we stand helps us to break up our ow n bias and narrowness . even before he 
opens his mou th to make a reply. That which becomes a clialogical experi ence for u;; 
here is not linuted to the sphere of arguments and counterar guments the exchange and 
unification of which may be the end meaning of every confrontation. Rather. as the 
experiences that have been descri bed indicate , there is 'something else in this experie nce. 
namely, a potentia lity for being other [Ander ss ei11s] that lies beyond every coming to 
agreemen t about what is common . 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Text and lnte rpreta 1io11, in Dialogue and Decon strucrion: The Gadam er-
Derrida Encounter 21, 26 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds .. Dennis J. Schm idt & 
Richard E. Palmer trans., SUN Y Press 1989). 
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Gadamer's hermeneutic account will not seem sophisticated 
enough to address the question at hand. Critics may doubt that the de-
centering experience of putting prejudices at risk in interpretation is 
possible and suggest that readers simply fool themselves and either foist 
their prejudices on the text or uncritically absorb the dogma of the text. 
How can we be sure that genuine interpretation founded in belief is 
possible, and that we are not consigned either to slavish exegesis to 
outmoded texts or hubristic manipulation of the texts by a contemporary 
interpreter? Has Gadamer's philosophical discourse added anything to 
Newman's characterization of the healthy development of a tradition? 
VATTlMO: NIETZSCHEAN HERMENEUTICS AND THE RETURN OF BELIEF 
Gianni Vattimo's "weak thought" brings Gadamer 's hermeneutical 
insights to bear on these questions in a very direct manner. Although 
Vattimo claims to be siding with Nietzsche against his former teacher, 
Gadamer, I have argued elsewhere that his work can be seen as an 
appropriate extension of Gadamer's themes.35 Vattimo emphasizes the 
central paradox of post-modernity: the collapse of methodologism and 
its dream of complete de-mystification has opened the space for a return 
to belief.36 Religion is a fact of the world, inasmuch as society is 
indelibly marked by the effective-history of religious texts. Philosophy 
simply has no standing to declare that this influence is "false" or to 
35. J contend that Vattimo helps to show how we might read Gadamer and Nietzsche together 
producti vely, and reject Vattimo's overly sharp distinction between his hermeneutical philosophy 
of "weak thought" rooted in Nietzsche and the later Heidegger. and Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics rooted in both the early and later Heidegger. Mootz. supra n. 2. at 1017-1026. 
36. Vattimo suggests that demythification "has finally turned against itself:" and "the 
untenability of scientistic and historicist rntionalism - both of which repudiated the very 
possibility of religion- has been widely accepted as a given in our culture." Gianni Vattimo, 
Belief29 (Luca d'l santo & David Webb trans ., Stanford U. Press 1999). As Vattimo 's translator 
summarizes, 
Nietzsche 's nihilism opens, paradoxically , the way to the recovery of the divine in our 
culture . The disappearance of the moral-metaph ysical God (the foundation principle of 
metaphysics) , then, may signify that the divine source may announce itself in the drift of 
interpretation . 
Luca d' Isanto, Introduction, in Vattimo, id. at 1, 16-17. 
On a personal level. Vattimo argues that he was attracted to the philosophies of 
Heidegger and Nietzsche precisely because they spoke to a Christian substrate that remained part 
of him even while becoming disaffected under the conditions otmodernity. 
In short: I have begun to take Christianity seriously again because J have constructed a 
philosophy inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, and have interpreted my experience in 
the contemporary world in the light of it; yet in all probabilit y I constructed my 
philosophy with a preference for these authors precisely because I started with the 
Christifill inheritance , which I have now found again. though, in reality, I had never 
abandoned it. 
Vattimo, Belief, supra, at 33. 
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provide a means of completely overcoming this heritage ( Oberwindung). 
Rather, philosophy is a means of working through a situation of thrown-
ness (Verwindung), of awakening to find that we are still dreaming and 
can only continue the dream creatively. 37 Vattimo concludes that he can 
only assert that he believes that he believe s, acknowledging a lived 
condition of thrown -ness (Abgrund) in which he is a believer without 
access to a mean s of validating his belief as truth.38 Belief is a lived 
condition that can't be disavowed; it can only be taken up and advanced 
more or less persuasively. 39 
Vattimo's nihili stic "weak thought" radicalizes Gadamer's account 
of interpretation. It does not refut e the criticisms of interpretations 
grounded in belief as much as it simply moves on. Radical critique-in 
the sense of stepping outside our beliefs to see the world as it really is, 
unmediated by textual traditions-is a modernist fairy tale; philosoph y 
is incapable of rescuing us from belief. But this is not to say that 
Vattimo is a nihilist in the commonl y accepted sense of the word. His 
"weak thought" rejects the possibility of stron g foundational truth s but 
continues to place faith in thinking, however "wea k" and chastened 
thinking may now be .40 
Vattimo regards the central event of Christianity, the Incarnation, 
as the defining feature of our post-Enlightenment condition. God is not 
an abstract or metaphysical entity , but rather has participated in human 
37. Gia nni Vattimo. The Trace of the Trace, in Religion 79-94 (Jacque s Derrida & Gian ni 
Vattimo eds., David Webb rrans ., Stanford U. Press 1996). Vatt imo wr ites: 
Perhaps not by its essential nature. but de /aero, . . . religion comes to be experienced as 
a return . In religion , somethi ng that wc had thought irrevocably forgotten is made 
present again. a domiant rrace is reawakene d, a wou nd re-opened, the repressed rerurn s, 
and what we took to be an Uberwindung (overcoming , realization and thus a sett ing 
aside) is no more than a Verwind1m~, a long convalescence that has once again come to 
term s with the indelible trace of its sickne ss. 
Id. at 79 . 
38. Vattimo, supra n. 36 , ar 70. 
39. This frequent theme in Vattimo's work is perhaps most succinctly stated in Gianni 
Vattimo , Beyond Interpretation : The Meaning of Hermeneutics.for Philosophy 109 (David Webh 
trans .• Stanford U. Press I 997). 
40. Vattimo·s "weak thought" represent s a return to the wisdom of rhetoric now that the 
project of metaphysical thinking has di ssemb led. Vat timo ' s "project of nihilism is to unmask all 
systems of reason as systems of persuasio n, and to show that logic- the very basis of rational 
metaphy sical thought-is in fact onl y a kind of rhetoric." Jon R. Sny der, Translator 's 
lntrod11ction, in Gia m1i Vatti mo , The End <?l }vfodernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in 
Postmodern Culture vi, :<ii (Jon R. Snyde r trans., Johns Hopkin s U. Press 1988). Vaniino makes 
clear that his rejection of metaphysical truth . Tnith wtth a capital "T," does not mean that we 
cannot experience truth in a manner that is subj ect to intc'l'rctation. debate and persuasion. He 
d~scribes his philosophy as "a way. howeve r ·weak.' of experienc ing truth. not as an object which 
can be appropriated and transmitted. but as a horizon and a background upon which we may move 
with care." Vattimo. End ol Modernit)', supra. at 13. 
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finitude. The kenosis , rather than an abasement of divinity , represents 
the power of being within a historical horizon , the power of the Word 
made flesh. 
Vattimo can speak of God as the one who is incarnated into 
language or, better, into an announcement which has lost the oppressive 
weight of the foundational principle. God is disclosed as a trace that 
makes itself felt in our language, and which appeals to us through the 
dialogical force of charity. In tum, if charity is understood in the light of 
kenosis , the self-exhaustion of God , then it constitutes the most sublime 
act of abandonment for the sake of the other. To participate in the 
hermeneutic experience, then, might mean to welcome the other in the 
name of the dialogical principle of charity , that is, by listening to the 
non-violent reasons of the other. 41 
God is an announcement within our history that must be 
continually interpreted by the guiding light of charity. This foundational 
faith brings Vattimo back to Christianity , from which he had never 
really escaped, as an ongoing project rather than a dictate from outside 
history. 
What does Vattimo's work teach us about Biblical and legal 
hermeneutics ? Vattimo argues that the return of religion is a symptom 
of our time and that post-metaphysical philosophy clears the way for the 
recognition of belief . This means that the connection between legal 
interpretation and scriptural interpretation runs much deeper than 
Pelikan suggests , and in a different direction . It is not fruitful to seek a 
general methodology of interpretation by examining these two 
di scipline s, but it is fruitful to recognize in these practices our fate as 
interpretive beings .42 Law and religion are undecidable. Both requir e a 
leap of faith to sustain a practice that will never come to an end. The 
4 1. D·rsanto, Introduction, supra n. 36, at 13- 14. 
42. After writing this essay, I came across Steven Smith 's intriguing paper, Hollow Men? 
Law and the Declension of Belief Steven Smith, Hollow Men? Law and the Declension of Belief 
(U. San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-03, Feb. 2005) (available for download from 
Social Science Research Network, http ://ssm.com/abstact=67268 l) . Smith argues that belief is 
the defining feature of our humanity . 
We are creatures oriented to truth, and yet . .. in our mortal, finite, fallen condit ion, our 
grasp of truth is tenuous. For the most part, we walk by faith seeing through a glass 
darkly, believing as well and as truly as we can: that seems to be our disiinctive fate and 
our special glory. And what we most essentially are- as individuals, as societies- is to 
a significant extent determined by what we centrally ~elieve . 
Id. at 3. Smith bemoans the declension of belief, in which notions of belief and truth are 
downgraded to pragmatically useful fictions in a world in which we no longer see anything 
beyond or behind positive law, id. at 9-13, and he examines how actual legal practice subverts this 
intellectualized declension, id. at 19-23. Smith aligns himself with a Christian hermeneutics that 
would have substantial cr itical bite, uncovering the necessity and role of belief in law. 
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idea that we might achieve perfect justice on earth is as implausible as 
the idea that we might complete our encounter with God. Vattimo 
emphasizes that we find ourselves in the midst of belief, believing only 
that we believe, and augmenting our belief through the hermeneutical 
and rhetorical practices that Gadamer artfully describes. 
Vattimo's thought may be "weak," but it has critical bite. Gadamer 
reveals that the de-centering experience of critique occurs when the 
interpreter risks her prejudices by engaging a text, and Vattimo extends 
these insights by emphasizing that this experience is always already 
underway and fated never to be completed. Belief propels us to 
relinquish our subjective designs and to attend to the other (person or 
text) that we encounter in dialogue. This is the Word: not a command to 
be followed, but a conversation to be taken up faithfully. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE DESTABILIZING AND CR!TlCAL 
DIMENSIONS OF BELIEF AS A CONSTITUTIVE FEATURE OF INTERPRETING A 
TEXTUAL TRADITION 
Jaroslav Pelikan concludes that Cardinal Newman's "notes" for 
assessing a vibrant hermeneutical tradition apply equally well to law and 
religion. These notes will trouble the methodological mind, for they 
provide no means to prove that an ongoing tradition is vibrant rather 
than corrupted. This does not indicate that Pelikan has failed, for any 
assessment of a tradition is no less hermeneutical and rhetorical in 
nature than the development of the tradition. Gadamer and Vattimo help 
to show that the notes illuminate our condition, and that this condition is 
one of belief. There is no methodological means to perceive the truth of 
a textual tradition , and so it is hardly an indictment of Pelikan that he 
does not provide a description of what cannot be done. 
Belief is not uncritical or dogmatic. Vattimo embraces the message 
of the Christian gospels, even though he is a gay, progressive public 
intellectual who rejects much of Italian institutionalized Catholicism. It 
is Vattimo 's deep and abiding belief in the Christian tradition that fuels 
his critique of the modem Catholic Church. Episcopal Bishop John 
Shelby Spong provides a similar example. Spong has provocatively 
challenged the Christian tradition as a believer, finding in his beliefs a 
critical distance from the pre-modem worldview of institutionalized 
religion. His dissenting declaration resonates well with legal critics, 
much as Newman's homage to religion resonates with them. 
So while claiming to be a believer, and still asserting my deeply 
held commitment to Jesus as Lord and Christ, I also recognize that 
1 live in a state of exile from the presuppositions of my own 
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religious past. I am exiled from the literal understandings that 
shaped the creed at its creation. I am exiled from the worldview in 
which the creed was formed. 
The only thing I know to do in this moment of Christian histoty is 
to enter this exile, to feel its anxiety and discomfort, but to 
continue to be a believer. 43 
399 
Thus is our fate~in law, religion and life. The ethical question is how 
we take up the challenge that is our inheritance as believers. 
43. John Shelby Spong, Why Christianity ,Hus! Change or Die: .4 Bishop Spt!ah to Believers 
in Exifr> 20 (Harper 1998). 
